Strategic Analysis on WeWork

1.0 Introduction of the Industry 

WeWork is one of the largest and well-known service offices in the world with 12 and growing physical coworking workspace in Singapore. The shared workspace concept has been gaining its popularity since 2005 where it changes how a company converts its mandatory CAPEX to OPEX with many other said benefits (Leclercq-Vandelannoitte & Isaac, 2016). This industry has become more research-worthy since the spread of COVID-19 where there could be a comparable number of businesses went bust that reduces the need for office space and the surges of new businesses due to a crisis (Kuckertz, et al., 2020) which will require a quick office solution. Further to that, WeWork has been one of the prime discussion topics within its industry when their former CEO Adam Neumann made bad decisions that hindered the company going public and leaving the company in such a mess that the white knight such as Softbank pulled out in their rescue (WSJ, 2019). In this seemingly crisis above crisis situation for WeWork, could a strong competition push WeWork to excel as rivalry has proven successful breakthroughs (SurakshaGupta, et al., 2016), break them completely or remain status quo. 

1.1 Growth Opportunities and Emerging Threats 

PESTLE and partial Porter’s 5 Forces analysis were being used to identify the growth and threat in the service office industry. Only the key areas of interests will be discussed.

Political [THREAT]

1. Real estate development creates jobs and developers pay high taxes for the land, the government would encourage more office space to be built.
2. Quota for hiring foreigners have dropped drastically and many existing permit holders have difficulty entering Singapore since COVID-19.

Impact

1. This would motivate more competition to enter the market.
2. More office space will become redundant and companies are forced to perform their work remotely.

Economic [OPPORTUNITY]

1. In an ordinary economic downturn, customer facing industries such as the retailer and tourism often get the worst hit (Cowling, et al., 2015).
2. Studies show office space is often underutilised (Steiner, 2006) and it was not a concern when the economy is doing well. COVID-19 motivates firms to cut cost and approaches lean methodologies to ensure their sustainability.
3. Unemployment creates more entrepreneurs (Gawe, 2010) which increase the demand for service offices. An economic crisis will also trigger a lower interest rate, more flexible tenure and lightened borrower’s requirement which gives strong service offices a fine opportunity to expand.

Impact

1. Most professional firms that were affected will still need commercial space and it is a good excuse to downsize into a more flexible and manageable alternative such as shared workspace.
2. Reduction of rental overheads and retrenchment of staff indeed helps with a firm's survivability, that will cause an influx of unemployed.
3. Cheaper and more manageable alternatives like WeWork will be considered when the entrepreneur chooses office space.

Social [OPPOTUNITY]

1. Generation-Z will make up our next workforce group and they are generally more competitive and are well-funded by their parents (Singh, 2014). They would not succumb to employability and even mild workplace abuse.
2. The trend of transparency and inclusiveness is on the rise where our net worth is our network.

Impact

1. This would lead to more entrepreneurship and hence the need of office space.
2. The demand for open concept offices will increase to curb the need to socialise.

Technological [THREAT]

1. Technology adoption was ‘forced’ to expedite with the outbreak of COVID-19. Artificial general intelligence is expected to realise between 2030 to 2050 and will replace between 30% to 70% of professional job roles (Deggans, et al., 2019).
2. Production house and machine maintenance will boom however such trade will require the industrial space instead.
3. Technology reduces the distance of communication (Treem & Jackson, 2010).
4. Distance collaboration has been made possible with software and those talents being managed remotely that does not require physical office space.

Impact

1. The advancement of software automation and artificial intelligence has and will continue to put out irrelevant firms which also reduces the demand of office space.
2. There will be a surplus of commercial space and the rental will continue to decline.
3. Elimination of the many traditional purposes of an office.
4. Meetings that are conducted at different time zones at the comfort of the participants’ location further repeal the need of meeting rooms which the shared workspace will provide at an affordable rate for resident tenants.

Legal [THREAT]

1. Rental contracts are strictly enforced and hence many businesses do not dare to enter into an agreement. 
2. There ought to be events held at such offices that include illegal fundraising and other activities that WeWork is unable to scrutinise every single one of them.

Impact

1. Seek alternative options like home office or a desk space from their friend’s company.
2. Suspension of operation or impose harsher criteria for such premise to operate that would cost more resources to operate.

Environmental [THREAT]

1. Having common facilities including lighting, air-conditioning, copier and other office equipment will reduce carbon emission and waste after the machinery's end-of-life.
2. More resources are actually being spent if a service office is below a certain occupancy rate as individual office usage will lower.
3. During a pandemic like COVID-19 or even common flu will result in high infection for open concept office.

Impact

1. Shared resources can be more efficient.
2. If a premise has lack of enough tenants, the facilities will still run as full operation.
3. Either additional cost will be spent to create partition, which defeat the initial purpose, or suspension of operation.

Figure 1. Highlighted focus areas in Porter's 5-Forces

Potential entrants [MODERATE]

Despite the high barrier of entry, new competitors continued to pour in internationally or emerge locally. The popularity is likely due to the lucrativeness where owning a piece of Singapore real estate will have a positive impact on the corporation asset performance (Tay & Liow, 2006) where its primary objective is income generation through rental while the secondary objective is the appreciation of real estate.

Small and medium firms made up the key clientele base of WeWork and the number of firms have been increasing over the years notwithstanding the financial crisis (Singstat, 2020; Statista, 2020). 

COVID-19 may result in a decline but there is a strong ground that this will only be a downswing. Besides, the Hong Kong political crisis leads to the relocation of their firms to stable countries like Taiwan, Japan and Singapore.

Bargaining power of suppliers [LOW]

The supplier group identified are mainly the property owners whereby the lesser suppliers including maintenance and miscellaneous functions are research-unworthy. The bargaining power of a landlord differs largely before signing the agreement and after. Increment of rental is one of the key factors that wreaks a business (Gupta, 2018) and the law protects the landlord in the event of early termination.

Singapore practices common law therefore all rental agreements include an escalation clause that allows the landlord to increase their rental based on certain criteria regardless of the tenure.

WeWork has only a fraction of bargaining power during the shopping phase however once the agreement is bound, the supplier will have the peak of upper hand.

There are mixed attributes in the shared workspace industry while it has and is performing well. Based on current market sentiment and above findings, it should continue to show a weak growth in the face of strong competitions and slow economy. The future could be promising as this industry is what businesses need and like any other industries, it will boom when the weaker links are being eliminated.

2.0 Social Sustainability 

There are two social dilemmas spotted in WeWork and the first, which is also the major, is their operation has been running in a loss since the establishment of the firm. WeWork has the fiduciary duty to upkeep the shareholders’ interest however many bad decisions have been made and requires additional injection for the company to stay afloat (WSJ, 2019). As WeWork is  founded in the United States, they could easily be seduced by how conveniently their Federal Reserve System will purchase the corporate debt (Reisenbichler, 2020). There will always be a negative impact that includes reckless spending and lack of prudence when a firm seems to have an endless amount of fundraising (Haynes, et al., 2014), which WeWork has been spoiled by their shareholders and the government in times of need.  Best case scenario is their business would finally take off without the need of new capital but they have already betrayed the trust of their previous shareholders. However, in the event WeWork requires extended fundraising, it would be a conundrum on whether they will unveil the truth which will dilute their chance or introduce deception to acquire the resource unscrupulously.

Figure 2. Extract From WeWork Profit & Loss Statement 2018 (SEC, 2019)

The second dilemma is how WeWork serves their tenants. The core intention of a service office is to have flexibility and that could even mean as a temporary solution for the tenants. In order to have attractive forecasts and consistent revenue, WeWork would like their tenants to stick with them for a long period. This could lead to the assumption that WeWork likes their tenants to do well and pay their rent promptly but not too well to move out of their premise, which is why they enforce long term contracts. One of the sustainability strategies is through rapid expansion (Reeves, et al., 2012) and that motivates the tenants to have their own private office. Having a private office will not only be more affordable in size, better privacy and it will also enhance the branding image of how others perceive them (Abratt & Kleyn, 2012). WeWork also provides hotdesking service which does not have a quota on how many people to a centre, COVID-19 social distancing initiative would reduce the number of work desks and that could create an overpopulated environment. 

3.0 Dynamic Capabilities

3.1 Primary and Support Activities 

Table 3. WeWork Summarised Financial from 2016 - 2018 (SEC, 2019)

For the past 10 years, WeWork has been running in a deficit and main cash flow is acquired through multiple fundraisings that also explains their low debt ratio. It is not common for established firms to have expenses almost twice as much as revenue which shows WeWork has been aggressively expanding their operations and building more tangible assets. With the above findings, WeWork’s game plan for their decent financial data is to be ready for an initial public offering. The problem is the IPO in 2019 failed and can they please the existing shareholders from taking liquidation actions even though their competition plan is going strong.

Figure 3. Summarised Value Chain of WeWork

Firm infrastructure. WeWork appears to have a strong presence across the world and the majority of their centres are located at prime sites. Being a young and well-funded firm, WeWork has the liberty to observe and select choice locations to establish their workspace. One of their key success factors is because they focused on a coworking environment instead of a service office which is a more popular option and it improves the overall performance (Leclercq-Vandelannoitte & Isaac, 2016). The hipness interior design promotes a young and energetic setting which has a positive health effect (Vimalanathan & Babu, 2014) for their members.

Human resource. The survey conducted by Blind (Vox, 2019) explains how much discontentment the employees have over its ex-CEO saga and majority of them fears retrenchment due to the high and unreasonable pay out. However, they still trust the vision of WeWork which displays great company culture. WeWork service staff received higher ratings than their competitors which explains why the employees felt overworked.

Technology development. The entire facility management from new subscription, booking of facilities, virtual mailing address management to billing of printing credits are all available through their seamless online portal. As quality networks are crucially important for entrepreneurs (Besser & Miller, 2011), WeWork creates an online social networking platform for their members to interact and seek potential investors. They consistently search for methods and local resources to synergise that creates competitive values for their members.

Inbound logistics and operations. Typically, businesses of a smaller group size will opt for service offices and WeWork has various configurations already in place that allows speedy induction. Every WeWork premise has a small warehouse for storing chattels in case the tenant wants extra furniture or brings their own. WeWork is also known for their last minute setup seminar or business event with their efficient operations and to prevent being misused, a nominal fee would be charged for express service.

Marketing and sales. Price transparency is regularly being seen as a fair play (Ferguson & Ellen, 2013) and for WeWork, their prices are openly available online. Being a company of sheer size and will naturally gain plenty of media exposure for free. To convert such good leads, WeWork is speed to respond and will handle each requirement professionally.

The rest of the activities are either subpar or not notable to be of good value.

3.2 Core Competencies 

Community-based workspace: Temporary competitive advantage

WeWork’s type of open coworking space with a touch of trendiness is a planned development. It would take a lot of resources for their competitors to alter their existing rigid setup with loss of income during the renovation period. This however does not apply to competitors’ new premises where they are able to design it from scratch and WeWork does not have a patent on it, that is why it is imitable.

Strong employee culture: Competitive parity

Employees are the most important asset in the company (Fulmer & Ployhart, 2013), therefore having a strong workforce will put any company to an advantage edge. However, not only this can be cultivated by any competitors, the former CEO saga has caused a bad reputation among the employees which may hinder their full potential (Wæraas & Dahle, 2020) which is why this cannot be a core competency.

Online social network platform : Sustained competitive advantage

Even this is a work-in-progress, the amount of value created for their members is immense. This feature is being perceived to be an entire ecosystem for an entrepreneur to raise capital, find partners, sell their product and expand all through the WeWork community. Besides none of their competitors is doing anything similar, it is rigorously difficult to replicate their effort. Similarly to Facebook, a platform is nothing remarkable whereas the critical mass generated is the key to success (Caers, et al., 2013).

Logistic efficiency : Competitive parity

Such internal capability can be replaced with alternatives like outsourcing the manpower when it comes to setting up or any ad-hoc requirement. It is so competitive in the market that logistic needs are no longer a rare feature.

Transparent pricing : Temporary competitive advantage

Typically when a potential customer enquiries about the service office rate, an account manager will try to solicit him for a physical tour and laboriously apply sales tactics. WeWork removed themselves from such obscurity that often backfire, and become completely transparent on their pricing. Nonetheless, they did spoil the market and with some effort, competitors can easily reshape their marketing strategy to fit and emulate.

3.3 Generic Strategy 

The primary business function of WeWork is to provide business working space and they have and should continue to ensure its highest standard of quality. The core competencies identified is the coworking design that improves the working efficiencies and the use of technology to bring their members and tenants to greater height. WeWork’s also provide holistic services that render themselves indispensable and the default go-to. With some uniqueness, WeWork also focuses on bringing their cost low and transparent, which this hybrid model clearly displays Porter’s integrated strategy (Călin, 2007). With their achievement and establishment, the identified strategic group of competitors will be Regus and similar. This group has the financial and capabilities to outdo WeWork which is worthy as the closest opponents.

Figure 4. Strategic group analysis for WeWork’s competitors

4.0 Strategy Evaluation

4.1 TOWS Matrix

Strengths (S)

S1. Coworking layout with a variety of different office sizes.
S2. Have a sense of community with networking access.
S3. Free amenities and is available for 24/7.
S4. Affordable price with full transparency.
S5. Achieved brand promise globally with the advanced know-how.

S6. Intense connection with the entrepreneurial ecosystem.

Weaknesses (W)

W1. Sparse offices and office space in certain areas.
W2. High reliance on new start-ups for take up.
W3. Internal political problems including high staff turnover.
W4. Absence of privacy.
W5. Limited product line.

W6. Effortless to imitate and require huge marketing effort to differentiate.

Opportunities (O)

O1. Achieved global market share.
O2. Singapore is undergoing gentrification.
O3. Leverage on technology and social network.
O4. Able to attain economy of scale through market consolidation.

O5. Gig-economy contributors are looking for alternative work spaces.

Threats (T)

T1. Cheaper alternatives such as home office.
T2. Highly competitive market.
T3. Persistence economic downturn due to COVID-19.
T4. Businesses prefer to work from home.

T5. Continuous rising of real estate price.

Strengths/Opportunities (SO)

O1+S6. Create opportunities to help businesses to expand globally.
O2+S1. Have a range of premium offices to maximise profit.

O5+S6. Build internal synergies to match suppliers and channels.

Weaknesses/Opportunities (WO)

O1+W5. R&D on new products and target existing customers.
O2+W1. Allocate separate investment vehicles to set up more offices.

O5+W2. Offers flexible terms to acquire smaller players.

Strengths/Threats (ST)

T3+S6. Promotes business generation through difficult times.
T4+S2. Show that relationships are built better through face-to-face.

T5+S5. Gradually increase the price to match the market.

Weaknesses/Threats (WT)

T3+W3. Make use of this period to axe problematic employees.
T4+W5. Develop a product range that can target home offices.

T5+W1. Consider cheaper locations with the same demand.

4.2 New Strategic Options 

COVID-19 reshaped how the economy works (Michie, 2020) and thus aggressive strategy is how a company outperforms their competitors (Roberts, 2003) may not work in this situation. Especially for WeWork, where they just had an IPO crisis, should adopt a defensive strategy for the next 5 years however they are heavily reliant on investment and the investors would expect capital appreciation regardless. All the TOWS quadrant includes a particular strategy of developing a product to enable business interactions and create opportunities between WeWork’s members. Only the Strengths/Opportunities (SO) is not being selected as this is part of an aggressive growth strategy. but may need a more passive approach to be executed and hence it will be discussed in other quadrants.

Weaknesses/Opportunities. WeWork only has a core product of shared workspace and as O1+W5 conveys, they should build on their online networking platform and productise it. If a platform enables entrepreneurs to seek new clients or investors, they will be willing to pay for it while WeWork can do it better by linking their existing worldwide members and host physical events at their many office locations. Members can be entitled to 3 connections a month and they are encouraged to purchase more when they see the benefits.

O2+W1 tackles on the existing investors who are having problems with the parent company and therefore a separate business arm should be created to allow investment per new office site instead of investing into the entire company. When the next listing opportunity is made available, the main holding company would acquire all such arms to increase its valuation (Ghaeli, 2017). This will help to expand the company without putting more tension to their previous saga.

O5+W2 aims to have a good mixture of large and small clients as customer loyalty is a major problem in the modern society (Lam, et al., 2004). Even though it would be tedious to manage more customers, WeWork would not be threatened by the departure of the few large accounts. The promotional perspective on these freelancers can include  free printing up to certain pages, free storage and further trade discounts for long-term packages.

Strengths/Threats. Basically T3+S6 and T4+S2 have the same properties as O1+W5 where WeWork’s secondary product should help improve its member’s revenue through community effort. To thrive during a recession, entrepreneurs need fresh strategies (Nickell, et al., 2013) and tapping into WeWork’s common community for synergies would be a strong method. As time is crucial, it is always better to work with familiar faces who you see every day.

T5+S5 emphasise on WeWork's established brand to increase their price due to the rising real estate cost. However it would not be ideal for the upcoming 5 years based on current economic outlook. Businesses like to justify their price by adding unwanted features that they thought is of value to the customers and this is exactly what WeWork should not be doing. Instead, recession is not the time to increase their price but to offer real value and break down the services to make it more affordable (Amissah & Money, 2015). Also, this could potentially poach competitors’ customers who prefer itemised pricing rather than bulk pricing.

Weaknesses/Threats. T4+W5 has been discussed in O1+W5 that is a viable product creation that can even generate revenue during an economic downturn. T5+W1 has the similar traits of O2+W1 that is to have new offices however considering the difficulty to raise funds during this period. As these strategies are derived from the same SWOT analysis, there ought to be similarity across quadrants.

T3+W3 serves two purposes. It helps to reduce cost in the face of an economic crisis and it is time to remove the leftover bad residue influenced by their former CEO. There are 2 groups of people who should be retrench in WeWork, namely the non-performing ones and those covertly supporting Adam Neumann. Being the founder, he would have won a certain degree of support from a certain group of people and to eradicate disharmony altogether, his entire partisan should be axed along with the non-performers (Lux, et al., 2012). This would reduce the expenses of WeWork significantly and improve the workplace consonance.

4.3 SAFe Evaluation 

Strengths/Threats of diversification strategy will be used to test against the SAFe criteria (Whittington, et al., 2017). T3+S6 and T4+S2 strategy is to create an online social networking platform as a diversified product that will bring synergy between their members in terms of revenue generation and funding purpose.

PESTLE

Diversification strategy addresses all the threats in PESTLE that aim at the future of service offices. The new product can conquer the loss of market share due to political and legal reasons.

5-Forces

This strategy will further deter new entrants on top of their already strong core competencies.

Strategic groups

WeWork is right in their strategic group with or without this strategy.

Value chain

It will further enhance the technology competency and reduce more loads on logistics and operations.

Organisation’s purposes

Horizontal growth introduces new revenue sources that will improve WeWork’s accounts and it helps their customers grow.

SWOT

Major opportunities and strength have been taken advantage of while major threats and weaknesses have been addressed.

Risk

Financial risks are capped to the minimal as this strategy is not expensive to implement or market as the target audience is within WeWork’s existing reach. The identified risk includes breaching of privacy and misrepresentation of service which has a low impact when triggered.

Return

Additional revenue from this strategy can come directly from the member’s purchase and indirectly it attracts more customers because of its immense value. The cost-benefit ratio will be of high positive due to the low implementation cost.

Reactions from shareholders

This strategy can be implemented without the shareholders and is looking at a mid to long term effect. They would prefer something more aggressive that will boost WeWork’s P/E ratio so they exit sooner. 

Financing

It can be financed internally without new capital injection.

Capability/ knowledge

WeWork has demonstrated the ability to manage multinational establishments and they understand what a start-up needs.

Marketing

To the minimum considering it is an offering to existing members.

Competitions

Retaliation from competitors would be mitigated as It will widen the competition gap.

Legal and ethicality

Minimum impact.

Human resources

Together with T3+W3, problematic staff will be removed and expect high receptivity.

Technology

Such a strategy requires technology that is widely available.

4.4 Product Development Strategy 

Figure 2. Ansoff Product/Market Matrix (Andrews, 1980)

Extending this new service of online networking platform apart from WeWork’s shared workspace is the more viable strategy for organic growth. The new service has the flexibility of complimenting WeWork’s core service or be standalone, having an accommodating strategy is the prerequisite for a product success (Kandemir & Acur, 2012). Product development at current times have a lower risk rating especially WeWork can tap on their existing members, it shortens the time to market and creates a competitive edge. First mover advantage with the necessary capability will reward the firm to a huge extent (Kang & Montoya, 2014).

WeWork profit statement is not healthy and venturing into new products can gain momentary performances. There might be some transition time needed to balance their matured and upcoming service, it aligns with the momentum necessary to retrench objectionable staff. Finally, WeWork has all the aptitude and technology factors to launch this seamlessly.

Bibliography

1. Abratt, R. & Kleyn, N., 2012. Corporate identity, corporate branding and corporate reputations: Reconciliation and integration. European Journal of Marketing, 46(7/8), pp. 1048-1063.
2. Amissah, G. & Money, U., 2015. Marketing During and After Recession. International Journal of Business and Social Science, 6(9(1)), pp. 87-95.
3. Andrews, K. R., 1980. The Concept of Corporate Strategy. Revised ed. Connecticut: Richard d Irwin.
4. Besser, T. L. & Miller, N., 2011. The structural, social, and strategic factors associated with successful business networks. Entrepreneurship & Regional Development , 23(3-4), pp. 113-133.
5. Caers, R. et al., 2013. Facebook: A literature review. New Media & Society, 15(6), pp. 982-1002.
6. Călin, G., 2007. Porter's generic strategies: a re-interpretation from a relationship marketing perspective. The Marketing Review, 7(4), pp. 369-383.
7. Cowling, M., Liu, W., Ledger, A. & Zhang, N., 2015. What really happens to small and medium-sized enterprises in a global economic recession? UK evidence on sales and job dynamics. International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship, 33(5), pp. 488-513.
8. Deggans, J. et al., 2019. Cognitively Enhanced Products, Output Growth, and Labor Market Changes: Will Artificial Intelligence Replace Workers by Automating Their Jobs?. Economics, Management, and Financial Markets, 14(1), pp. 38-43.
9. Ferguson, J. L. & Ellen, P. S., 2013. Transparency in Pricing and Its Effect on Perceived Price Fairness. Journal of Product & Brand Management , 22(5/6), pp. 404-412.
10. Fulmer, I. S. & Ployhart, R. E., 2013. “Our Most Important Asset”. Journal of Management, 40(1), pp. 161-192.
11. Gawe, A., 2010. The Relationship between Entrepreneurship and Unemployment in the Business Cycle. Journal of International Studies, 3(1), pp. 59-69.
12. Ghaeli, M. R., 2017. Price-to-earnings ratio: A state-of-art review. Accounting, 3(2), pp. 131-136.
13. Gupta, S., 2018. The Rent is Too Damn High and the Coverage is Too Damn Low: Evidence from Medicaid Expansion and Eviction Rates. Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government, 90(1), pp. 1-105.
14. Haynes, K. T., Campbell, J. T. & Hitt, M. A., 2014. When More Is Not Enough: Executive Greed and Its Influence on Shareholder Wealth. Journal of Management, 43(2), pp. 1-30.
15. Kandemir, D. & Acur, N., 2012. Examining Proactive Strategic Decision‐Making Flexibility in New Product Development. The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 29(4), pp. 608-622.
16. Kang, W. & Montoya, M., 2014. The Impact of Product Portfolio Strategy on Financial Performance: The Roles of Product Development and Market Entry Decisions. The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 31(3), pp. 516-534.
17. Kuckertz, A. et al., 2020. Startups in times of crisis – A rapid response to the COVID-19 pandemic, 13(1), pp. 1-13.
18. Lam, S. Y., Shankar, V., Erramilli, M. K. & Murthy, B., 2004. Customer Value, Satisfaction, Loyalty, and Switching Costs: An Illustration From a Business-to-Business Service Context. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 32(3), pp. 293-311.
19. Leclercq-Vandelannoitte, A. & Isaac, H., 2016. The new office: how coworking changes the work concept. Journal of Business Strategy, 37(6), pp. 3-9.
20. Lux, S., Crook, T. R. & Leap, T., 2012. Corporate political activity: The good, the bad, and the ugly. Business Horizons, 55(3), pp. 307-312.
21. Michie, J., 2020. The covid-19 crisis – and the future of the economy and economics. International Review of Applied Economics , 34(2), pp. 301-303.
22. Nickell, D., Rollins, M. & Hellman, K., 2013. How to not only survive but thrive during recession: a multi‐wave, discovery‐oriented study. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing , 28(5), pp. 455-461.
23. Reeves, M., Haanaes, K., Love, C. & Levin, S., 2012. Sustainability as Adaptability. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 24(2), pp. 14-22.
24. Reisenbichler, A., 2020. The politics of quantitative easing and housing stimulus by the Federal Reserve and European Central Bank, 2008‒2018. West European Politics , 2(43), pp. 464-484.
25. Roberts, K., 2003. What Strategic Investments Should You Make During a Recession to Gain Competitive Advantage in the Recovery?. Strategy and Leadership, 31(4), pp. 31-39.
26. SEC, 2019. The We Company. [Online] Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1533523/000119312519220499/d781982ds1.htm [Accessed 19 August 2020].
27. Singh, A., 2014. Challenges and Issues of Generation Z. IOSR Journal of Business and Management, 16(7), pp. 59-63.
28. Singstat, 2020. Topline Estimates For All Enterprises And SMEs, Annual. [Online]  Available at: https://www.tablebuilder.singstat.gov.sg/publicfacing/createDataTable.action?refId=15808 [Accessed 18 August 2020].
29. Statista, 2020. Number of small businesses in the U.S. 1988-2017. [Online] Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/257521/number-of-small-businesses-in-the-us/ [Accessed 18 August 2020].
30. Steiner, J., 2006. The art of space management: Planning flexible workspaces for people. Journal of Facilities Management , 4(1), pp. 6-22.
31. SurakshaGupta, K.Malhotra, N., Czinkota, M. & Foroudi, P., 2016. Marketing innovation: A consequence of competitiveness. Journal of Business Research, 69(12), pp. 5671-5681.
32. Tay, L. & Liow, K. H., 2006. Corporate real estate management in Singapore: A business management perspective. International Journal of Strategic Property Management, 10(2), pp. 93-111.
33. Treem, J. W. & Jackson, M. H., 2010. The Connectivity Paradox: Using Technology to Both Decrease and Increase Perceptions of Distance in Distributed Work Arrangements. Journal of Applied Communication Research , 38(1), pp. 85-105.
34. Vimalanathan, K. & Babu, T. R., 2014. The effect of indoor office environment on the work performance, health and well-being of office workers. Journal Of Environmental Health Science & Engineering, 12(113), pp. 1-8.
35. Vox, 2019. 85 percent of WeWork’s white-collar employees don’t think Adam Neumann’s $1.7 billion exit package is fair. [Online]  Available at: https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/10/28/20932657/wework-blind-survey-layoffs-exit-package-adam-neumann-softbank [Accessed 20 August 2020].
36. Wæraas, A. & Dahle, D. Y., 2020. When reputation management is people management: Implications for employee voice. European Management Journal, 38(2), pp. 277-287.
37. Whittington, R. et al., 2017. Exploring Strategy: Text and Cases. 12th ed. London: Pearson.
38. WSJ, 2019. SoftBank to Boost Stake in WeWork in Deal That Cuts Most Ties With Neumann. [Online] Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/softbank-to-take-control-of-wework-11571746483 [Accessed 17 August 2020].