Project Management Report on Panama Canal Expansion

Executive Summary

This assessment critically reviews the project structure and success factors of the expansion of Panama Canal. The 3 parties involved are the Panama Canal Authority who have the full jurisdiction of the project, CH2M Hill who act as the consultant for this project and the Grupo Unidos Por el Canal consortium who is the contractor to expand the Panama Canal. By expanding, it is actually building a 3rd lock in an alternate route which is wider to replace part of the conventional canal route. The project consortium is huge and the limited word counts discourage discussion for every party therefore only the Panama Canal Authority and CH2M Hill will be actively debated. The discussion in this assessment also covers the communication hurdle between project members, meticulous risk management done and how the project can be improved. It is heavily referenced through journal articles and credible news reports as the completion of this project happens only at mid of 2016, there is limited academic material for full citation.

1.0 Project Brief and Introduction to Project History and Life Cycle

Panama Canal is a synthetic waterway dug in Panama that is 77 kilometres long and is located in Central America (Wang, 2017). This canal connects the Atlantic and Pacific oceans which reduces more than half of the conventional travelling time through the Cape Horn path (Wang, 2017). The United States has been operating the Panama Canal for more than a century and has successfully returned the administrative rights to the Panama government by the end of 1999 (Panama, 2014). Significantly, 5 percent of the world’s trade passes through the Panama Canal (Bhadury, 2016) however as trading progresses, the previous canal was no longer able to support larger vessels. Hence, Panama Canal Authority (ACP) held a referendum to build a third lock and the Panamanians unanimously agreed (Marucci, 2012) as it will continue to boost Panama’s economy and create more jobs. Panama Canal was planned at a budget of $5.2 billion and the timeline is to be completed within 9 years, it was accomplished with a budget of $5.4 billion and a total of 11 years instead (LATimes, 2016). The expansion of Panama Canal has become a worldwide topic and is a flagship project in the maritime industry even since the construction of its first lock.

Figure 1. Project Life Cycle Phases (Archibald, et al., 2012) of the Expansion of Panama Canal

The life cycle of the Panama Canal expansion project (PCEP) consists of 5 stages namely Initiation, planning, execution, testing and closure. In August 2007, ACP released the invitation to bid and only until January 2008 the planning process started (ACP PR, 2009). The planning ended in August 2019 which is exactly 2 years of groundwork. As the critical success factor for a project is to have a discerning plan (Szopik-Depczyńska & Lanfranchi, 2016), ACP has done a fine job. The tasks in execution phase are running in parallel, it is identified as fast-tracking which reduces the construction time (Pena-Mora & Park, 2001) and this further confirms ACP have done quality project planning. It is also assumed that PCEP adopted mainly on the Waterfall methodology since construction plus government projects are unlikely to encounter changes (Kannan, et al., 2014). PCEP was supposed to be completed in 2014 however the deficient concrete mix and locks' electromechanical issues (JOC, 2014) pushed the full adjournment to late 2015 and only testing was done on that year.

The reason PCEP case study was chosen for this report is due to its global impact and rich project substance from exceeded project budget, exasperated delay to involvement of global culture.

Figure 2. Translated Gantt chart of PCEP (Cocatram, 2011)

2.0 Internal Management of the Project and Project Consortium Partners

Table 1. Overview of PCEP project consortia (ACP July, 2009)

As the table above, PCEP is only made possible with an experienced and committed team. This flawless alliance contributes to the success of a vastly complex project (Cicmil & Marshall, 2005; Cooke-Davies, 2002; Marrewijk, et al., 2010). There are already a sizable number of reports that megaprojects such as PCEP will encounter under budget, heightened delays, low-grade results and many unforeseen circumstances (Flyvbjerg, et al., 2003; Cicmil, et al., 2006; Akinci & Fischer, 1998). This has been confirmed by the consortium claiming ACP and have won the arbitration (Reuters, 2017). There are 4 initial consortia present for tender and GUPC has won the contract. Even though tender invokes competitiveness, it does not mean the quality will be inferior (Domberger, et al., 1995). The selection process consists of 3 different teams to evaluate the various designs and plans in a stringent and professional way. It was further audited by CH2M Hill and Deloitte (ACP July, 2009) to prevent misunderstanding from common home country biasness (Hoekman, 2018). Naturally, GUPC won the tender by an astonishing one billion lower than the nearest contender and received the backlash of cost overrun, completion delays and bothersome but acceptable defects (Reuters Lomi K., 2014). The result becomes contradictory to what Domberger expects as in the PCEP case, the lowest bidder indeed has proven that quality is being compromised.

Figure 3. Organisational chart of PCEP team (Robertson, et al., 2018).

Winning the contract is just the first step of the project and what GUPC has to worry about is managing its vast 41,168 man project teams (Robertson, et al., 2018). From figure 3, CH2M sits on major important roles to oversee and mentor the entire project team. Being an appointed advisor unlike the contractor consortium who went through intensive bidding, will be more subjected to a level of dissatisfaction and politics become inevitable (Andersen, et al., 2010). Though CH2M was in a consultative position, they are under the chaperone of ACP and some of the employees felt restrained or disagreeable (Smits & Marrewijk, 2012). On the contrary, ACP felt they were functioning under the shade of CH2M (Smits & Marrewijk, 2012) and further complicated the situation. It is fair for ACP to have complete control of the project based as they are under the direct authority of the Panamanian government and CH2M is a paid advisor regardless they have brilliant experience. Programs instead of project management were also adopted in PCEP due to its sheer size and also the level of ambiguity this project posed (Tam, 2010). Smaller tasks are then redefined into projects for better control and measurement, this is also to ensure the earned value can be tracked more efficiently (Acebes, et al., 2014). CH2M and ACP play it right by implementing “one team, one mission” slogan to set the culture right. There are significant role switches between 2010 and 2013 mainly because CH2M core function is to guide the project team to success, eventually the team will be heading the endeavour. This approach is relatively effective gauging from how CH2M withdrew from most of the project manager roles in 2013. 

2.1 Project Team Approach to Risk Management 

It is crucial for risk to be managed in a project when it is as lengthy and costly like the PCEP. As risks could be unpredictable, an undefined major risk could fail the project entirely (Junior & Carvalho, 2013). Gatun lake that could affect 1.4 million people (Niesten, et al., 2001) and Panama Canal is a major water with global economic impact, the risk of this project extends beyond measure. Unfortunately, huge maritime projects use heavier machineries and have higher fatality rates when safety is neglected (Oswald, et al., 2015). All such factors will have direct negative implications on the budget and timeline. Risk management approaches in PCEP were done seriously with thorough design planning, feasibility testing on the design and an exhaustive risk survey modelling technique (Alarcón, et al., 2011).

Knowing the gravity of this project, ACP adopted the best practices of risk management and procedures for enormous projects which summaries into identification, analysis, planning, implementation, monitoring, control, documentation and communication (Hillson, 2016; Ashley, et al., 2006; Wideman, 1992). Such a risk management process seemingly will bring a clearer grip, more pragmatic approach and more precise reporting. However, the cost overrun and launch delay does question the risk management process wholeness where there ought to be blind spots that will be overlooked. 14 major risks were selected out of the initial 200 potential risks (Alarcón, et al., 2011) and “testing risk” was not presented in it that eventually caused the most delay. Seepage was caused by the extreme stress test (AJOT, 2015) that would not be presented under the normal circumstances, hence all sills have to be further reinforced and this is where it upsets the budget and timeline. It was correct for the PCEP to follow a guideline so they can pass the audit while it is impossible to work on all the risks. The risk management process could have been better with a balance of less bureaucracy and more industry expert opinions to tackle such issues.

3.0 Project Communication and International Scope of the Project 

Right amount of communication supersedes frivolous relays (Hung & Lin, 2013) and specifically when it is done internationally of different culture, nonverbal communication poses more weight than the verbal ones (Burgoon, et al., 2016). The project team consists of members from different countries and in this section I am only going to discuss the communication between ACP and CH2M. Remote coordination is one trigger that could cascade into a project failure (Šmite, et al., 2008) and it is fortunate that CH2M’s team was physically present throughout the entire project.

Good intention misunderstood. Spanish is the national language in Panama and even though around 15% of Americans spoke Spanish in 2007 (Pick, et al., 2011), the common language is still English. As much as CH2M is trying to be expressive, there ought to be times where one is exhausted to further explain themselves or thought of simpler terms for everyone to understand. This could be the reason “one team, one mission” cannot be revitalised and ACP’s team even find it a waste of time (ACP program manager, informal conversation, May 2010).

The shadow of the past. ACP tries to promote an equal relationship between the Americans and the Panamanians as it will set the playing field right and make construction projects more straightforward (Gale & Davidson, 2006). The knot revolves around the Torrijos-Carter Treaties where America has the full jurisdiction of the Panama Canal until 1999 (Eisenmann Jr, 2013) and furthermore Panamanian Balboa is tied to the United States Dollar (USD). Even though ACP is the paymaster, the sensitivity between first world and third world puts the American in a stronger front. This situation induced inferiority (Duckitt, 1992) and may cause the Panamanian to stand objectivity towards it.

Against, for the sake of it. The fieldnotes in September 2009 further denotes the dissatisfaction of ACP’s team where they complained about the suffocating meeting space, insufficient seating capacity and project room seems like a theatre. The lack of seriousness and motivation often cause such deviance (Michel & Hargis, 2016; Wingerden & Stoep, 2017) and create disharmony between parties. The team also found the project meetings are one-sided with all CH2M agendas and felt compel voice out just for the sake of it.

Communication was not effective to begin with as ACP expects CH2M to vest their knowledge and experience to them while CH2M is doing all the work without considering the knowledge transfer portion (Smits & Marrewijk, 2012). They could have got the wrong intention due to miscommunication or unable to factor in mentorship due to the tight timeline.

4.0 Stakeholder Management

Table 2. Other stakeholders of the PCEP with a group of investment banks (Sanjur, 2019).

Comprehensively, the stakeholders of this project go beyond the direct project members listed in table 1. External or indirect stakeholders often have a significant impact on the project in unimaginable dimensions (Marques, et al., 2019). Identifying and engaging all the stakeholders effectively will have a more positive outcome of a project (Bourne, 2016), which also reduces the risks involved. Water is the most basic essential for the 1.4 million individuals around the Gatun lake and if there is even a chance of water shortages, it could spiral out of control and affect the project timeline. Drought has been known to cause riots or conflicts (Almer, et al., 2017; Kreamer, 2012) and it is to no surprise such events can fall on the PCEP when they have consistent water shortage issues. Next it is important to maintain a good relationship with banks as they could terminate the project loan if they find out the project is not progressing. Though it is not common for a bank to terminate a sovereign level of loan, Panama’s credit rating may be affected if the loan goes awry (Huang & Shen, 2015). Lastly, the customers are the very reason why the Panama Canal was being extended, there are alternate routes and ACP need to ensure the expectations of the customers are well-covered. The alternate path could be the Cape Route or Suez Canal and the Northern Sea Route where it is lengthier but less hassle and cheaper (Ho & Bernal, 2020). With almost 2 years in delay, ACP needs to wheedle and assure their customers that this route is going to be sturdy and ready soon.

4.1 Cultural Differences 

Figure 5. Hofstede country comparison (Hofstede Insights, 2020). Panama is the blue bars and United States is the purple bars. Insufficient data for Panama on long term orientation and indulgence.

The strong power distance in Panama and mid power distance in the United States suggests that ACP believes in hierarchy system and could assume CH2M trying to play an authority figure while CH2M could simply be just expressing themselves.

High individualism suggests performance and reward is more important than relationship (Teng & Yazdanifard, 2015) and that could be one lacking in CH2M. CH2M might be too focused on the project core scope and neglected the connection between team members.

It is typical for a developed country to veer towards masculinity as they progress upward on the Maslow hierarchy to seek more competitions (Yawson, et al., 2009). Panama being a developing country (Joyce, 1992) is more feminine because to them PCEP is a job and not a challenge as to CH2M.

Even though low uncertainty avoidance introduces innovations (Hofstede, 1983) to the project process or execution method, it does not necessarily bring benefits to the table. ACP is more risk-averse while CH2M, combined with their high masculinity, might be tempted to experiment on the PCEP.

Panama does not have statistics for their long term orientation however based on the history of Panama Canal and its impact (Pham, et al., 2018), the 3rd lock is something the ACP wants it to last. This suggests CH2M wants the project over and done quickly while ACP is interested in its future.

Indulgence will be skipped due to lack of information.

4.2 The Approach 

The organising factors for enormous projects like the PCEP still puzzles many researchers (Van Marrewijk, 2015). Without managing the complexity and cross-cultural well, a project can be debilitated and end with starvation (George, 2020). Karen Smits developed the Collabyrinth model with six components of conflicting conditions, storytelling, synergising, seeking consent, crafting reciprocal relations and submarining (Smits & Brownlow, 2017) on how PCEP’s stakeholders communicated.

As discussed earlier, ACP’s intention for CH2M is entirely mentorship and knowledge transfer, and not to be under their chaperoning. ACP eventually conforms to such an arrangement to put the project first and it reflects how external project factors like this should be considered beforehand (Engwall, 2003). As figure 5 suggests the Americans are more innovative even in the ways of management, traditional management style in megaprojects might be more effective (Bresnen, 2011). Smits’ Collabyrinth also includes a major part of synergising that explains how public-private partnership projects consist of more uncertainty (Van Marrewijk, et al., 2008) which will demand more effort in their stakeholder management.

Conflict management was also another area CH2M and ACP practices throughout the project as relationships are important to ensure the continuation of a project (Vaaland, 2004). CH2M did a good job by adopting a more tolerated and kind approach where in the field notes it stated the meeting attendees commended how CH2M management lightened up the atmosphere of the room and used words like ‘revise’ instead of ‘reject’ (Smits & Marrewijk, 2012). Revise is more passive without assertiveness and that makes the members more willing to get things done (O'Connor, 2018).

As good value continues to instil into one another, ACP views the chaperoning differently and builds a profound relationship with CH2M. This concludes the need of persistence in inculcating good principles towards each other and despite initial conflicts, there will not be any dissociation between the project teams (Veenswijk & Berendse, 2008) so they can complete the PCEP in harmony.

5.0 Project Success Factors 

As all projects are just temporary endeavours (Rose, 2013), it will eventually cease and be terminated (Hormozi, et al., 2000). The type of termination however will reflect how well the project ends. The PCEP was terminated through extinction because they have completed their scopes, turned the project into a working product and transferred to the project sponsor’s team (Dvir, 2005). Almost no projects are able to close smoothly which could likely be due to the need of after project support (Mossalam, 2018) or a possible business relationship nurturing decision (Bengtson, et al., 2018). Unlike other megaprojects where the contractor provides warranty on their completed project for a fixed duration of time (Wang, et al., 2019), PCEP cannot adopt this as their 3rd gate is non-functional altogether during the stipulated completion date. The very fundamental of project management revolves around the 3 constraints namely timeline, scope and budget (PMP, M.S.D, 2004), which are the elements that will be used to measure the success factors of PCEP.

Budget. Many project managers get obscured when it comes to the dollars and cents as it is common to go for the lowest bidder (Shrestha & Pradhananga, 2010). It has become a common trend where more than 60% of megaprojects have their cost overrun to an unacceptable extent (Lichtenberg, 2016) and this applies to PCEP as well. The initial budget for PCEP is $3.2 billion where $2.3 billion will be loaned through the bank listed in table 2 and at the end of the project it has escalated up to $5.4 billion (The Maritime Executive, 2017). The next nearest bidder was the Bechtel/Taisei/Mitsubishi consortium who bid $1.2 billion higher (The Maritime Executive, 2017). It is a relief that PCEP is a government project as private sector projects could already be terminated through starvation (Wirick, 2009). As budget can determine how long the team can continue to work or reduce the project timeline through fast-tracking or crashing (Long, 2016), and it can also reduce or improve the functionalities, budget is the most important factor in a project.

Timeline. The complication of a well-planned timeline is the readjustment when tasks are being delayed and shifted (Geraldi & Lechter, 2012). The PCEP was initially scheduled to be ready on the memorable 16 August 2014 as the 100-year anniversary (Taylor, 2015). The hope was severely dashed when the expanded canal was officially inaugurated on 26 June 2016 (Canal de Panamá, 2018) with almost 2 year of delay. Hence, the underachieved milestones in the PCEP timeline caused conflicts in making external decisions by the project sponsor (Altahtooh & Alaskar, 2018).

Scope. A well-defined scope will always have a positive impact on its execution (Fageha & Aibinu, 2013). Especially for complex construction projects like the PCEP, having a thorough scope can give confidence to its stakeholders that the project team has excellent knowledge and understanding (Mirza, et al., 2013) of such construction. The most important function of the 3rd lock is to accommodate a 13,000 TEUs Neopanamax vessel which they have successfully demonstrated. As precise as it is, the rest of the scope is fulfilled according to the initial plan (Menarguez & de la Flor, 2017).

Figure 7. Partial extract of PCEP completed scope (Menarguez & de la Flor, 2017).

5.1 Project Success Discussion 

Based on the triple constraint as discussed above, 2 out of 3 elements have failed badly which technically conclude the project is only successful to a low extent. There were claims and lawsuits between ACP and GPUC (EWHC, 2017; Labrut, 2013) which may affect GPUC’s future project bidding rating (Taherdoost & Brard, 2019). In my personal opinion, the project is not successful while the product has achieved huge triumph.

The frowning

• Customers were reportedly complaining about the delays but it is an essential route so they just have to grumble silently (Universal Cargo, 2015).
• 2% of the vessels encountered minor accidents due to lack of training and the customers were not happy about the delay it caused (VOANews, 2017). 
• Johnny, who was the project manager for PCEP shared that the experience of the project team may not be sufficient, the master plan was not validated by all key stakeholders, there was a lack of expert review and documentation was not done properly (WONG, 2015).

The delight

• ACP is proud that the teams are able to collaborate effectively and the reuse of the Gatun lake water results in no complaints from the nearby residents who depend on it (Pansic, 2018).
• More customers want to use the canal despite there being some accidents and an increase of 12% in containers moving across the 3rd lock (Huang, 2017). 
• Number of vessels in the world using the Panama Canal has increased to 6% and the crossing fee is way more affordable than the fuel spent on alternate routes (Fan & Gu, 2019).
• Tremendous traffic achieved and investment houses are upping the ratings of Panama Canal (Campbell, 2018).
• Response was fantastic that more vessels from America passed through the canal and even America’s own ports might be threatened by it (Crandall, 2017).
• The Panamanian government is happy about how this project will generate jobs for the Panamanian and the positive financial impact when it is ready (O'Brien, 2015).
• In 2017 and 2018, ACP has generated almost 1.2 billion and 1.4 billion respectively which could pay off their debt within 8 years (ACP, 2019).

6.0 Recommendations 

In section 3.0 we have identified that ACP discontent about how CH2M seems to be of a higher hierarchy than them and this was not the intention of the America company (Smits & Marrewijk, 2012). Also, CH2M’s culture is toward a more easy-going style so they are not particular over the size of the room or the sitting arrangement, which is viewed as a negative output by the ACP staff (Smits & Marrewijk, 2012). I would strongly recommend CH2M to view beyond project requirements, put in some effort in human management and work on their communication style with counterparts from different backgrounds. Many disgruntlements would have been avoided and the entire project could have been smoother. With high individualism (figure 5), CH2M could also get ACP to involve more into the project as collectivism yields better results in complex projects (Man & Lam, 2003).

Most construction projects including the PCEP adopt waterfall methodology however they could have reduced the delay with a little agile methodology in place. It is uncommon for construction projects to embrace agile but it can be done with some tweaks (Streule, et al., 2016). In fact, a construction project has higher success when more agile methodology is in place (Hassan, 2018). The huge project delay was caused by the extensive testing and poor concrete mix (Zuidema, 2016). If the PCEP adopted agile, the problems can be found earlier and rectification could have been made for the rest of the construction. It may seem like there will be wastages to test every part of it after it is completed but collectively it actually enhances the entire progress of the project.

Besides communication and material issues, section 5.0 highlighted the budget overrun issue could be caused by underbidding from the GUPC consortium. No matter how good a project can be controlled and executed, there are ought to be beyond control external factors (Adeleke, et al., 2018). A more thorough conceptualising and planning exercise could have made the PCEP a better success.

7.0 Conclusion 

Communication plays an important role but it might not be as crucial as the way this project was managed and handled. PCEP remained a global engineering feat and has demonstrated unequally project strength. It could definitely have a better outcome but no one really knows how complex this project was. It is always easier to comment and give criticism on something that was not performed by us so I would like to give credit to the dedicated PCEP team. This assessment helped me to further understand the interchangeable need between agile and waterfall methodology, critical communication skill between project teams and looking beyond the project flow for better risk mitigation. It gives me a confidence boost on forming and running a complex project should I have the opportunity to encounter one.

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